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The proliferation of state and local measures to address climate
change has spawned a lively debate. Much of this debate seeks to
identify why sub-national levels of government would, seemingly
illogically, grapple with an international challenge of global magnitude.1
This is especially a puzzle since others’ inaction or opportunistic actions
can defeat benefits of state and local activism.2 Some question the
efficacy of such state and local efforts.3 A broad consensus notes,
however, that in this and other areas of environmental regulation, state
and local regulatory interventions have catalyzed support for federal
legislation, with once vocal industry opponents coming to prefer federal
legislation over often-diverse state and local measures.4 Scholars and

1. See, e.g., Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is
Motivating States and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does
This Say About Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1021-25
(2006); Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate
Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962-63 (2007); Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities
as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary Vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L.
REV. 681, 683-88 (2008).
2. See Engel, supra note 1, at 1023 (“[F]rom the perspective of benefiting from
reductions in climate change, it makes little economic sense for a state or local
government to reduce its emissions of greenhouse gases.”); Stewart, supra note 1, at
689-93.
3. See, e.g., Wiener, supra note 1, at 1962 (“[S]ubnational state-level action is not
the best way to combat global climate change.”); but see David E. Adelman & Kirsten H.
Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change Policies to Induce Technological Change, 50
ARIZ. L. REV. 835, 837 (2008) (“[I]nducing technological change provides an
independent ground for state action on climate change—one can think globally and still
act locally.”).
4. See RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING
OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 209 (Yale Univ. Press
1999); J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The
Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1504-1508 (2007); E. Donald Elliott
et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental
Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326 (1985); Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska,
Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32
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policymakers broadly agree that larger-level responses are also necessary,
ideally via international legal instruments and national legislation and
implementing regulation.5
This conference essay turns to a less addressed question that is
becoming a central one in legislative venues. If the United States enacts
national climate change legislation, what role, if any, remains for state
and local greenhouse gas (GHG) regulation? This is, in part, a question
for state and local governments that might be considering the utility of
their own additional measures once federal law is enacted. It is also,
however, a question that federal legislators, regulators, and, ultimately,
courts will need to resolve. Should federal climate change legislation
preempt state and local climate-related efforts? If so, to what extent and
through what sort of language and institutional structures? Is a clean and
predictable preemptive regime even possible? If the presumption is to
retain most or all of state and local governments’ plenary powers to
address climate change and other sources of risk and concern, how
should legitimate claims of conflict between federal and state or local
law be resolved? Finally, are there attributes of climate change policy
that make it particularly suited to preemptive or non-preemptive federal
legislation?
This Article starts in Part I by reviewing the basic anticipated design
elements of federal climate legislation, then it reviews the substantial
regulatory failure risks inherent in such climate-change legislation. It then
turns in Part II to analysis of preemption choices. The Article follows in
Part III by examining preemption jurisprudence, especially the growing
risk of broad preemptive reads of federal law, and demonstrating how
statutory uncertainties regarding preemption could result in subsequent
interpretations substantially expanding the law’s preemptive impact.
The expanding and indeterminate body of “obstacle preemption” law
poses especially significant risks for state and local climate change
efforts. After all, it is virtually unavoidable that residual state and local
regulation will overlap with any federal climate law while also adopting
somewhat different priorities and means to regulatory ends. Obstacle

ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 223-26 (2005) (labeling this phenomenon as a “domino effect” in
which state regulation triggers industry to prefer federal regulation).
5. See, e.g., William L. Andreen, Federal Climate Change Legislation
and Preemption, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 261, 266-69 (2008); Jonathan B.
Wiener, Property and Prices to Protect the Planet, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 515,
522-23 (stressing the importance of global participation).
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preemption jurisprudence threatens to justify judicial preemptive
conclusions if state or local laws merely strike a different balance than
federal law. Furthermore, as discussed in Part IV, overlap and interaction
of concurrent federal, state, and local climate change laws creates an
array of benefits. This Article, therefore, concludes that federal climate
legislation should adopt an anti-preemptive norm, with specific language
preserving state and local legal turf.
The Article closes in Part V by suggesting that still inevitable conflicts
will arise, but that such preemption disputes over climate-related
regulation, whether raised by governments or private actors, should be
analyzed in accordance with strongly anti-preemption statutory criteria.
Even better would be direction of preemption claims not straight to the
courts but to a newly created Preemption Review Committee. The
Preemption Review Committee, like the Endangered Species Review
Committee that can authorize otherwise illegal harms to endangered
species in extraordinary circumstances, would be constituted of high
level federal officials from several agencies and departments as well as
state representatives. This new committee would take evidence on
claims of unduly burdensome legal conflicts and issue a record-based
ruling. Only then would judicial review enter the picture. This procedural
hurdle and requirement of record evidence of undue conflicts would
preclude litigants and courts from making conclusory arguments about
conflicts. Such a committee-structured regulatory crucible would serve
to check preemption arguments and try to ensure that preemption
decisions are based on both statutory criteria and on actual evidence
about the effects of overlapping state, local, and federal law.
I. CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION AND THE INEVITABILITY
OF PARTIAL REGULATORY FAILURE
Pending federal climate legislation has a number of basic elements.
Despite some ongoing debate over whether a carbon tax or a federal
“cap-and-trade” scheme would be more effective to address climate
change, current momentum favors a cap-and-trade scheme.6 This Part
6. See Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address
Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 348-53 (2008) (comparing and preferring a
cap-and-trade scheme to a carbon tax approach); Jonathan B. Wiener, Radiative Forcing:
Climate Policy to Break the Logjam in Environmental Law, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 210,
238-42 (2008) (advocating a cap-and-trade scheme for GHG emissions). For more works
discussing the mechanics of a cap-and-trade system, see Lesley K. McAllister, The
Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 398-410 (2009)
and Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach to Global
Climate Policy: Issues of Design and Practicality, 9 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 83, 103106 (1992) (discussing cap-and-trade in the international context).
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discusses the basic anticipated architecture of federal climate legislation
and ways it is likely to result in at least partial regulatory failure.
At its most basic, federal law would set a national GHG-cap measured
by annual aggregate emissions of carbon dioxide equivalents of various
GHGs, with that cap dropping over time. Via some sort of distribution
of carbon dioxide (CO2) allowances to polluters, all emitters of GHGs
would have to emit no more than their purchased or received allowances.
Some of these allowances would likely also be generated by “offsets,”
usually natural states, technologies, or actions that actually serve to
reduce anticipated atmospheric GHG levels, thereby generating offsetbased credits, which in turn would function like allowances. To
minimize costs associated with reductions in GHG emissions, entities
holding or needing allowances would participate in a GHG market,
trading CO2 allowances and offset credits. This would allow a market to
function, with low-cost measures to reduce GHGs or produce offsets
rewarding best performers by reducing their need to purchase
allowances and allowing them to profit by selling allowances to emitters
less able to reduce their emissions. A cap-and-trade market would thus
reward lowest-cost-emissions reducers and also allow emitters lacking
easy ways to reduce pollution to buy or hold onto allowances for their
own use. Liberal provisions allowing banking of allowances and credits
would also provide emitters flexibility and reward innovators able to
reduce emissions. Since a GHG emitted anywhere has the same effect
everywhere (if taken by itself, with no associated more local effects),7
trading should greatly reduce costs associated with legally mandated
GHG reductions.
Federal legislation is also likely to contain other measures mandating
or incentivizing efficiency improvements for consumer products and
cars. Federal law will likely also help with adaptations for climatechange harms and disruptions likely to result from a law mandating
GHG reductions. Federal law might also set performance standards for
certain categories of large emitters, in effect requiring them to do their
best to reduce GHG emissions, totally separate from cap-and-trade
dynamics.
7. This will seldom be the case, since GHGs are often separately regulated for
other effects, often are accompanied by co-pollutants, and have other harms and
distributional effects associated with their production. These realities are discussed infra
in Part I(C).
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This sounds clean, efficient, and likely to benefit from the miracle-ofmarket economics. In reality, however, climate change legislation is
unusually vulnerable to a large number of regulatory failure risks.
A. A Cap That is Too High
Federal law that sets the cap too high is perhaps the greatest failure
risk. Despite abundant science establishing the substantial role of
anthropogenic contributions to climate change and a growing consensus
about atmospheric levels needed to avoid potentially catastrophic
effects,8 congressional politics are never solely science-based. Due to
huge industrial and regional tradeoffs, as well as costs and possible
benefits associated with climate change and any climate-change law,
legislative horse-trading to gain necessary votes is inevitable.9 A likely
result of hardball legislative politics is a federal law that sets the target
cap too high or ratchets down its caps at too slow a rate to effect needed
atmospheric reductions. This is especially risky during a time of
economic recession, as is the case during mid-2009, while this Article is
being drafted. A federal law that imposes economic hardship on an
already-struggling United States economy would be politically difficult
for legislators to support. A highly likely result is a weakened federal
law that reduces costs and burdens by raising its cap to gain political
viability. Critics of the bill that emerged from the House of
Representatives at the end of June 2009 criticized it on just these
grounds, claiming the cap is both too high and too slow to require actual,
substantial reductions.10
Other developments confirm the risk that any ultimately enacted law
will be unduly lax and not prompt needed swift innovations and
pollution reductions. The shift during the spring of 2009 to a federal bill
that would not distribute allowances by auction, as preferred by most
policy analysts, to a law that freely hands out allowances to powerful

8. See generally M.L. PARRY ET AL., IPPC 2007: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTION AND VULNERABILITY 7, 11-18 (2007),
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf.
9. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 4, at 1539-45 (analyzing the interaction of
various interest groups and the potential legislative result); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540-44 (1983) (discussing how “[a]lmost all
statutes are compromises”); Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional
Federalism: Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1199, 1238-40 (discussing legislative compromise).
10. John M. Broder, House Passes Bill to Address Threat of Climate Change, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 2009, at A1 (reporting passage of bill by House but also opposition of
some environmental groups on grounds that bill is too lax).
IN
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interests11 is evidence of the importance of political compromise and
appeasement of legislative and industry opponents.12 This shift may
have been necessary to assemble an adequate supportive legislative
coalition, but auctioning such allowances would be a more effective
means to accomplish both environmental and market goals. Auctioning
all or most allowances would create immediate incentives for everyone
to ratchet back their pollution because every unit of emissions would
require purchase of an allowance or possibly an offset credit.13 In
addition, incentives for innovations, conserving energy, and reducing
pollution would be enhanced with more entities bidding for allowances,
if new market entrants were not monetarily disadvantaged compared to
grandfathered pollution sources receiving free allowances, and if old
polluters were not rewarded with allowances.14 In addition, money
generated could be used to finance other government projects. With free
allocations, in contrast, wealth associated with allowances flows into
private hands, and the incentive to reduce emissions is reduced
immediately because allowances are allocated free-of-charge.15 This
would likely reduce their market price and certainly reduce pressure on

11. See, e.g., Key Provisions of the Climate Bill, WASHINGTON POST, June 27, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/26/AR2009062602746.html
12. However, as Lesley McAllister observes, despite policy analysts’ preferences
for distribution via auction, preceding analogous cap-and-trade regimes have
also ultimately allocated pollution allowances for free, mostly to existing polluters.
McAllister, supra note 6, at 411.
13. As Professor Merrill observes, whether pollution is subject to a tax or a
purchase obligation, the effect is akin to a Pigouvian tax. By associating pollution with a
monetary charge, all polluters will face at least modest incentives to reduce emissions.
See Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275, 276
(2000). For more detailed discussion of incentives and the choice of free distribution of
pollution allowances versus auctioning such rights, see discussion infra notes 14-17 and
accompanying text.
14. See generally Chulho Jung et al., Incentives for Advanced Pollution Abatement
Technology at the Industry Level: An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives, 30 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 95 (1996) (ranking regulatory instruments and incentives created for
innovation, and finding freely distributed permits inferior to auctioned permits and other
incentive-based instruments); Scott R. Milliman & Raymond Prince, Firm Incentives to
Promote Technological Change in Pollution Control, 17 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 247
(1989) (assessing pollution-reducing instruments, and finding auctioned permits to
provide the best incentives for innovation); Thomas H. Tietenberg, Tradable Permits in
Principal and Practice, 14 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 251, 271 (2006) (discussing innovation
incentives undercut if new market entrants face higher costs than grandfathered polluters
or others given free pollution rights).
15. See Stavins, supra note 6, at 317-21 (discussing the disadvantages of free
allocations).
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polluters receiving free allowances to innovate and reduce emissions.16
Yet, if the focus is on the cap, if free allowance allocation is the political
price to have the law enacted, and if trading will follow the free
allocations, then the environmental results over the long term should not
dramatically differ.17 Nevertheless, a shift to free allocations does
reduce short-term incentives for pollution reduction and also weakens
innovation incentives. It is a near certainty that more similar
compromises will weaken the law’s environmental benefits.
Furthermore, despite the strong scientific consensus about the roots of
climate change and its potential dramatic effects, climate change’s
causes, effects, and regulatory responses all confront a handful of
cognitive and political economic shortcomings that are likely to create
either pressures for a lax cap or delayed reductions in that cap.18 For
citizens to demand climate change legislation and legislators to supply it
will require both to give great weight to a largely invisible threat of
uncertain effect that will become most evident at least decades in the
future. A common cognitive shortcoming identified in behavioral law
and economics scholarship is poor human ability to sort out different
magnitudes of risk, especially those that are unfamiliar and will arise in
the future.19
Furthermore, climate change is likely to require virtually everyone in
some ways to change how they usually behave. Change tends to be
opposed due to the “status quo” bias under which people value what they
have more than they would pay to obtain the same status in the first
place.20
For legislators, the status quo bias is compounded by political
economic dynamics. Businesses, regulators, and interest groups invest
16. See McAllister, supra note 6, at 422 (noting the relationship between market
price and the incentive to innovate).
17. See Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature: Which Federal
Climate Change Legislative Proposal Is “Best”?, 102 NW. L. REV. 123, 139 (2007)
(“Whether allocations are auctioned or given away will have little effect on the ultimate
economic efficiency of the policy, since trade will efficiently allocate the allotments.”).
18. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate
Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153
(2009); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 299, 304-11 (2000).
19. See Joni Hersh & W. Kip Viscusi, Allocating Responsibility for the Failure of
Global Warming Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV 1657, 1684- 92 (2007) (discussing the
problems of uncertainty and discounting).
20. For works discussing the status quo basis, see William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the
Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 33-36 (2003);
Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case
for “Asymmetric Paternalism”, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1224- 26 (2003); and William
Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 7, 7 (1988).
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in any particular regulatory arrangement and will frequently see any
change as undercutting past investments and requiring new investments.21 A
climate law would lead to pervasive changes and hence would be met
with resistance.
Major storm events like Hurricane Katrina may create a pro-climatechange legislation availability heuristic, under which people weigh
recent and significant experiences more heavily than other concerns.22
The availability heuristic could also, however, lead citizens, stakeholders, and
legislators to focus on more immediate and pressing challenges like the
recession, medical costs, or wars abroad. Furthermore, legislators are
sure to hear from industry stakeholders due to lobbyists and substantial
monetary stakes in any climate legislation; legislators may come to
weigh those oft-heard views more heavily than the interests of citizens
or the environment that may have few, if any, spokespeople. When one
adds in the influence of funded lobbyists and political contributions, the
influence of dollars will cut against a rigorous climate-change law.
In combination, these cognitive tendencies and often-linked political
economic dynamics explain the low priority given by most citizens to
climate change.23 It similarly is consistent with the seeming indifference
21. An unsettling change in the law will predictably require new investments by
those affected to adjust as necessary. Those responsive investments can possibly lead to
resistance to subsequent change, even efforts to return to the original status quo. See
generally William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation,
149 U. PENN. L. REV. 171, 206-210 (2000) (in criticizing judicial tendency to engage in
“one-Congress fiction” in drawing interpretive inferences from language usage in
different statutes, discussing political economic dynamics surrounding unsettling judicial
interpretations of disputed language); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of
Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 435-40 (1989) (exploring how original enacting political
coalitions are unlikely to join together again to correct an unexpected change in the law
due to how those changes will also change the law’s distributional impacts and resulting
incentives).
22. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1127-28 (1974); see also Cass R. Sunstien, On the Divergent
American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 534-40
(2007) (discussing the availability heuristic in the context of terrorism and climate
change).
23. A 2009 poll and study revealed that despite an avalanche of news items about
climate change science, passage of a climate bill by the House of Representatives and
debate over such a bill in the Senate, most citizens had little or no understanding of the
goals or content of a “cap-and-trade” bill. See Christa Marshall, Most Americans still
foggy on cap and trade, CLIMATEWIRE, Oct. 16, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2009/
10/16/3 (discussing Pew Research Center for the People and the Press report following a
poll).
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of many legislators. Correspondingly, the lack of any single institution
or actor with chief responsibility for climate ills or legislation, and the
likely dispersion of regulatory roles among numerous committees and
regulators, means that both enactment of climate legislation and
subsequent implementation drift are a risk due to “regulatory commons”
dynamics.24 Under such dynamics, a risk or social ill that is effectively a
regulatory opportunity shared in common with many, and that creates a
setting where blame and credit flow in uncertain ways, can lead both
those potentially demanding and supplying regulation to ignore a social
ill, leaving it a regulatory gap. This has long been the status of climate
change. Climate-change legislation still has a chance of enactment
during 2009 or 2010, but the same political economic and regulatory
commons dynamics that have long frustrated climate change political
efforts remain barriers and, even if a law is enacted, threaten to derail
subsequent implementation.
B. The Cap Proves Too High or Slow
Even if Congress and the President miraculously get the cap right at
the moment federal legislation is enacted, there is no guarantee it will
remain appropriate. Scientific data on climate change causes and effects
continue to develop rapidly. Many supposedly worst-case scenarios
discussed in the most recent International Panel on Climate Change
report have proven to be unduly optimistic.25 In addition, economic and
political dynamics remain unpredictable, as does the development of
new industries and products. The net implication of this area of rapid
change and uncertainty is that subsequent scientific, political, and
economic development is highly likely to reveal that the cap is too high
or too slow in planned reductions. But once a federal law is enacted,
strong resistance to any amendment is a certainty. An ineffective law
that is locked in place would be a major regulatory failure.
C. Changing Science and Predictions About
Climate and Markets
Predicting and modeling climate change’s causes, effects, and future
implications is a massive, complex undertaking at the bounds of human
and computer capacity. For example, until the last few years, few people

24. See Buzbee, supra note 20; Engel & Saleska, supra note 4, at 190-91.
25. See, e.g., Roger Pielke, Jr. et al., Dangerous Assumptions, 452 NATURE 531,
531 (2008).
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focused on the massive contribution of cattle and cow emissions26 or on
black carbon emitted from widespread use of inefficient stoves and other
dirty forms of combustion.27 Even the best-intentioned federal law could
prove to be aimed wrong, either missing major causes or risks or possibly
over-regulating risks that prove minor.
In addition, the effectiveness of a cap-and-trade strategy is based on
complex assumptions about market behavior and production methods. A
huge question is whether a cap will create enough scarcity to reward
entities reducing emissions or creating offsets. A cap that is too high
would undercut a new carbon market. In addition, a new cap-and-trade
scheme can be destroyed if claims about baseline emissions or future
emissions are inaccurate, if policing of market trades and actual
emissions proves inadequate, or if cheating pervades the market.
Markets need scarcity, reliable monitoring, and enforcement. Where a
regulatory regime is creating and relying on a new massive market,
regulatory failure will flow ineluctably from market failures. Cruder,
more tested forms of regulation, such as technology-based performance
standards, or perhaps a carbon tax, might be necessary if cap-and-trade
proves a disappointment.
D. Cap-Lowering Delays
The timing of cap reductions is critical both to achieving reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions and in creating market scarcity that will
reward pollution reductions and prompt innovations.28 Even if the
ultimate endpoint cap is sound, the interim steps to get there can be too
slow and lax, thereby also undercutting the market. Although society
has an interest in rapid reductions in GHGs, those most directly affected
will surely lobby to put off the day when production and behavioral
changes, and attendant expenses, will have to be confronted. And if
interim caps are too lax, especially in combination with initial distribution
of free carbon allowances, incentives for innovation will be minimal and
incentives for innovations undercut.
26. See, e.g., Allison N. Hatchett, Note, Bovines and Global Warming: How the
Cows are Heating Things Up and What Can Be Done to Cool Them Down, 29 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 767 (2005).
27. See, e.g., V. Ramanathan & G. Carmichael, Global and Regional Climate Changes
Due to Black Carbon, 1 NATURE GEOSCI. 205, 226 (2008).
28. See McAllister, supra note 6, at 419-423 (discussing the problems of delays in
emissions reductions).
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E. Innovation Errors
Opponents of climate legislation mainly focus upon economic
hardship and putting the United States at a disadvantage in a highly
competitive world.29 They predict high costs of adjustment, dislocation
of industry and workers, and market and technological innovations that
will trail legislative mandates. This could, of course, be true. However,
if precedent is our guide, major industries over recent decades have
repeatedly claimed that regulations mandating reductions in pollution
and risks would have massive resulting costs. Actual studies after the
fact, however, have repeatedly shown that those predictions were far
higher than reality.30 Part of those disparities likely results from strategic
exaggerations of anticipated costs in an effort to either shift regulatory
burdens elsewhere or defeat regulation outright.
New regulatory burdens also may cost less than predicted due to the
manner in which new regulatory schemes themselves prompt and reward
innovation. Any new regulatory regime creates market opportunities.
Both those burdened by new regulation and those who can profit from
sale of cost-saving innovations have incentives to produce or find lowcost innovations to reduce the targeted risk. Incentives for low cost
innovations are especially strong under a market-based environmental
law regime that rewards any risk reduction by allowing a polluter to sell
unused pollution rights or reduce the need to acquire them. Predictions
about climate change legislation’s effects could similarly err in
predicting possible rates of progress and costs of meeting regulatory
mandates. Especially with market dynamics under a cap-and-trade
scheme, large and small cost-saving innovations could substantially
differ from anticipated outcomes. However, due to possibly inordinate
fear of compliance costs, the level of capped GHG reductions might be
too high and rate of decline too slow, not adequately anticipating and
reflecting the benefits of responsive innovations.
II. THE PREEMPTION CHOICE MENU
Climate change legislation is critical, but it faces numerous regulatory
failure risks. From the viewpoint of many prominent industry
stakeholders and their allies, a major impetus for federal law is a

29. See, e.g., Christa Marshall, Can Farm Groups Kill the Climate Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June
30, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/06/30/30climatewire-can-farmgroups-kill-the-climate-bill-71264.html?scp=2&sq=climate%20legislation%20opposition&st
=cse.
30. See, e.g., Winston Harrington et al., On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost
Estimates 19 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 297, 300 (2000).
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different sort of regulatory risk. Polluters tend to dislike the existence of
overlapping regulatory regimes due to resulting legal complexities,
additional legal obligations, and the possibility that obligations imposed
by state or local law will be more stringent than federal law.31 Polluters,
therefore, see federal law as a means to undercut or preempt outright
state and local law as well as common law litigation directed at climate
change and its many contributing sources.32 As Professor Andrews and
others have long noted, proliferating state and local laws can turn
industry opponents of regulation into advocates for a single federal
law.33 But a new federal law could, in fact, utilize several different types
of preemption, partial preemption, or non-preemptive choices.34 The
leading federal climate bill appears likely to utilize a partially preemptive
strategy. This Part explains the preemption choices in very basic terms
and then sketches briefly the likely partially preemptive strategy in
federal climate legislation.
A. Preemption Strategy Choices
A totally preemptive federal regime is possible but has been a rarity in
addressing pollution, environmental harms, and other risks. A totally
preemptive federal law would make federal law the sole regulator of a
field of concern. Contributors to such a risk would look exclusively to
federal law to ascertain their obligations. Complete preemption is an
industry dream, especially if the preemptive law is also lax, but in reality
it is extraordinarily rare. First, as discussed below, the broader the
regulatory goal, the harder it is even to devise a preemptive regime due
to unavoidable areas of regulatory overlap. With a ubiquitous source of
risk such as GHGs, almost any activity relates to climate change.
Displacing hundreds of areas of state and local regulation due to one risk
associated with that activity is unworkable. Second, where a genuine,
thorny social ill is the challenge, legislators will often want federal, state,

31. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The
Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 (2003)
(discussing problems of regulatory accretion).
32. For discussion of industry’s efforts to use preemption to gain regulatory relief,
see THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR (Yale Univ. Press 2008).
33. See ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 209; Elliott et al., supra note 4, at 326.
34. For a summary of preemption doctrine, see Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme
Court Preemption Doctrine, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF
FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 119 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009).
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and local actors to work together to address the ill.35 If the preemption
question concerns the ongoing viability of common law regimes, federal
legislation seldom will assert broad preemptive impact due to both the
lack of compensatory remedies in most areas of risk and environmental
regulation and the benefits of common law regimes in ferreting out
neglected areas of undue risk.36
Complete or near complete preemption is thus rare. It is at its most
justifiable where a particular product design is at issue and that product
both benefits from production economies of scale and is widely
distributed. Thus, for example, the Clean Air Act generally embraces a
non-preemptive strategy, but car emissions are subject to a single federal
standard unless California is granted a waiver to require its own lesspolluting cars.37 At that point, other states can choose between the
federal and California car. Similarly, federal appliances are subject to a
federal efficiency regime, with California able to petition to require even
more efficient appliances.38
A completely preemptive federal law would create a unitary federal
standard, in effect setting a regulatory floor and ceiling.39 A regulatory
ceiling would prohibit even similarly directed state or local laws from
doing more to address a risk or harm. Despite the rarity of such
complete preemption in the law, federal agencies and some industry
advocated for it with success from around 2005 to 2008, late in the
administration of George W. Bush.40 That broad preemption is a rarity
outside quite specific regulation of product features is unsurprising.
35. See Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony, in PREEMPTION CHOICE,
supra note 34, at 33, 42-44 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) (discussing the benefits of
state and federal regulatory overlap); Stewart, supra note 1, at 699-704 (weighing the
cost and benefits of continued state regulation in the presence of federal regulation).
36. See David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Risks, in PREEMPTION
CHOICE, supra note 34, at 54, 56-58 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) (arguing that “tort
law is an important backstop to regulation”); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187,
1202-04 (2009) (contrasting FDA’s new 2006 pro-preemption views with the FDA’s
longstanding opposite view that FDA regulation and common law regimes
served complementary functions, furthered statutory goals given an often underfunded and
understaffed FDA, and created appropriate incentives for manufacturers).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1), (e)(2)(A) (2000); See also Anne E. Carlson,
Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281
(2003) (discussing these provisions) [hereinafter Greenhouse Gas Emissions].
38. See generally Ann E. Carlson, Energy Efficiency and Federalism, 1 SAN DIEGO J.
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 11 (2009).
39. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1567-76 (2007); see also Robert L.
Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption
by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U.
L. REV. 579, 602-610 (2008) (analyzing the limited justifications for ceiling preemption).
40. See MCGARITY, supra note 32; Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble:
Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007).
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After all, when regulation concerns behavior, production processes, and
harms associated with behavior or production, uniform regulatory
burdens will be rare; production variations and context-based distinctions,
often worked out through permitting procedures, will lead to diverse,
tailored legal obligations. In such settings, a uniform law is unnecessary.
The far more prevalent federal preemption choice is to enact a law that
is only partially preemptive, typically with provisions that explicitly
preserve or “save” state and local law. Such prevalent laws often
contain other provisions that seek to enlist state and local involvement
through cooperative federalism structures. This norm utilizes federal
law as a floor.41 Federal law sets a certain minimum allowable level of
risk and prohibits any jurisdiction from dropping its standards to be
more lax. This is the explicit legislative choice in most environmental
laws. Similarly, food and drug regulation, while not always explicitly
preserving state and local regulatory turf, has been long- construed by
most federal regulators and courts to assume the ongoing existence of
common law regimes and non-conflicting state and local regulatory
protections.
Federal law that purports to be completely non-preemptive is possible,
but due to the workings of the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, it is
difficult to envision a law that does not at least potentially act to preempt
conflicts or create a federal regulatory floor. Still, a federal law that
regulates a source of risk could rationally declare itself completely nonpreemptive and allow a proliferation of state and local laws directed at
similar ends. But if, in application, a federal and a state or local law
were to come into direct conflict by, for example, mandating two
mutually inconsistent designs, then federal law would preempt the
clashing law.42
B. The Likely Federal Climate Change Legislation
Preemption Choices
Preemption choices, like most regulatory choices, are heavily
influenced by the particular attributes of the regulatory challenge. Such
attributes include the underlying physical, scientific, and economic
realities, preceding related regulatory regimes, the stakeholders,
and risks and rewards for both those demanding regulation and those
41.
42.

See Buzbee, supra note 39, at 1564-68.
See Schroeder, supra note 34, at 131-35 (discussing conflict preemption).
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who can supply it. In addition, the regulatory strategies and tools used
to address an ill—such as performance-based standards, design
mandates, information revelation, or utilization of market-creating or
mimicking strategies—will shape the viability and efficacy of the chosen
legislative architecture and related preemption choices. As discussed in
succeeding Parts, a portion of the answer to the preemption choice
question is driven by the ubiquitous nature of activities contributing to
rising GHG levels and the unavoidably huge number of regulatory fields
relating to GHG emissions.
Federal climate legislation is virtually certain to contain efficiency
standards for cars, appliances, and perhaps even homes and buildings.
Such standards, to have any effect, need to set a regulatory floor at a
minimum. A federal efficiency floor would be much like those in place
for cars and appliances. The question is whether to allow more stringent
state and local regulation. Even that choice, however, actually splits into
three dominant likely choices: an exclusive federal standard that
becomes the unitary standard, operating as a ceiling and a floor; a
presumptive exclusive unitary federal standard subject to a limited opt
out or waiver for California, perhaps with other states able to piggyback
on California’s different and more stringent choice; or, lastly, a federal
standard that operates as a floor but gives state and local governments
discretion to enact more stringent standards without any preceding
approval.43 Any of these options could be implemented just by federal
actors or potentially through cooperative federalism structures, especially
delegated federal programs that hand implementation and enforcement
authority over to states.44
It is hard, however, to implement a workable delegated program
federalism structure with anything more preemptive than a federal law
setting a regulatory floor. When a state assumes delegated program
duties, states will necessarily tailor their implementation of federal law
to their own laws, contexts, and political priorities. A fully preemptive
federal floor and ceiling would be unlikely to offer states the latitude
they need and would likely engender preemption litigation by targets of
state regulation. Perhaps for this reason, all federal environmental laws
with delegated program provisions are accompanied by savings clauses
43. Of course, a limited opt out for a particular state need not choose California,
but the tradition of special treatment for California and its history of innovation and
leadership make it the most likely choice for any such partial opt out from an otherwise
federalized regulatory regime. See generally Ann Carlson, Iterative Federalism, 103 NW. U.
L. REV. 1097 (2009).
44. See Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism Proposal for Climate Change
Legislation: The Value of State Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 791,
814-23 (2008) (discussing cooperative federalism models).
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making clear that states can make their own laws more stringent than
federal law.45
The most important and distinctive principal element of a federal
climate bill would create a federal cap-and-trade regime. As summarized
earlier and discussed in accompanying conference papers, especially that
of Professor Kaswan, the federal government would set a series of
declining GHG caps.46 The cap would be enforced by only allowing
GHG emissions pursuant to a federal allowance acquired from the
government either via an outright grant, via purchase at an auction held
by the federal or perhaps state governments, or via acquisition from
other allowance holders who find it more profitable to sell than use
them. Allowances (or credits usable in ways akin to allowances) could
also be created by offset activities.
A cap-and-trade regime could itself utilize diverse preemptive and
non-preemptive options. Key questions are whether there should exist
only a single federal GHG trading market or whether states or regions
should retain the ability to continue with their own slightly older, but still
young, cap-and-trade regimes.47 It appears that there is broad agreement
that an initial shift to a single national market, which eventually would
tie into an international market, is preferable to having parallel, but
possibly slightly different, GHG trading regimes. 48 However, the
agreement that a single federal, national GHG trading regime constitutes
the best scheme is separate from the question of whether state or local
governments should retain the power now or in the future to restart (or
start anew) a state or local GHG trading market.
For a cap-and-trade market to work, it is critical that the sellable
commodity—the CO2 allowance—be a uniform currency.49 The same

45. Even those few more fully preemptive provisions—for example, car emission
and appliance efficiency standards—provide a safety valve allowing petitions for more
stringent regulation by California and piggybacking states. See Carlson, supra note 37;
Glicksman & Levy, supra note 39, at 640-42.
46. See generally Alice Kaswan, Decentralizing Cap-and-Trade? The Question of
State Stringency, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 103 (2009) .
47. See Andreen, supra note 5 at 275-82 (discussing state and local climate change
initiatives, including in-state and regional cap-and-trade regimes).
48. See Stavins, supra note 6, at 324-27 (discussing the relationship between a
federal cap-and-trade scheme and existing state and international programs).
49. See Jillian Button, Note, Carbon: Commodity or Currency? The Case for an
International Carbon Market Based on the Currency Model, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
571 (2008); see also James Salzman & J. B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification
of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000).
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holds true of offsets that would generate allowances. Thus, the criteria
for CO2 allowances and offsets likely need to be nationally uniform if
the national market is to work. To create a uniform currency requires
that the relative climate change effects of different gasses compared to
CO2 be agreed upon, ensuring that allowances, wherever generated, have
the same value. In effect, an allowance needs to be like a dollar or some
other monetary metric with an understood value. Much as Afghanistan
needed a uniform currency rather than diverse tribal currencies,50 the
United States needed a single federal currency rather than distinctive
state currencies,51 and even the European Union needed to shift to a
single currency to start functioning as a union,52 a liquid and efficient
GHG allowance market requires a consistent currency. In order for free
trade across state and, possibly, international lines to succeed, allowances
need to have an understood unit of value so that polluters can assess
their emissions and allowance needs or surplus.
The leading federal climate bills resolve these questions by mandating
a single, federal cap-and-trade market that preempts all other such
markets for six years. Existing markets are given means to shift to the
federal scheme, but for six years, the cap and related trading would be
under an exclusively federal market. The leading bills’ provisions
regarding state power are quite clear that this time-limited preemption is
only of state regulatory strategies utilizing cap-and-trade elements; state
authority to regulate GHG emitters through other strategies is preserved.
The next part turns to strategies to ensure that additional state regulation
is effective to reduce emissions.
C. The Thorny Excess Allowance Issue
A climate law should generally preserve broad state and local climate
authority outside of (a) a preemptive federal cap-and-trade market,
including a consistent national allowance currency and (b) preemptive
federal floors regarding various sorts of efficiency standards, ensuring
that no jurisdictions adopt more lax standards.53 The law might also (c)

50. John F. Burns, Threats and Responses: Kabul; For Afghan Central Bank, It’s
Out With the Old Money and In With the New, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2002, at A10.
51. See generally ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A HISTORY OF THE DOLLAR (Colum. Univ.
Press 1957).
52. For a brief history on the development of the Euro, see Kathy Jones & Alan N.
Rechtschaffen, The Euro—Ready of Not: Trading Implications of the New Common
Currency, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 786, 790 (1999).
53. As discussed below, this Article advocates that states retain power to charge
more in allowances for particular emitting conduct than federally required. Hence, this
Article sees defining allowances as requiring uniformity but with states retaining latitude
to require more allowances per unit of GHG emission. As discussed in the text above, this
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create a preemptive unitary federal efficiency standard for certain
categories of goods but, like the current Clean Air Act automobile
standards, allow California and other piggybacking states the option to
do even better.
One other difficult and important preemption-drafting choice will
likely require explicit and clear resolution. This concerns the ability of
states to act more aggressively in reducing GHG emissions under a
partially preemptive federal law and the problem of resulting unused or
unsought carbon allowances.54 This problem is most likely to arise in
connection with regulation of major stationary sources, such as power
plants and factories, but it could also concern the regulation of sources
like commercial and municipal transportation fleets or other significant
categories of GHG emissions. Major stationary sources of pollution are
already subject to numerous regulatory obligations under the Clean Air
Act. State and local governments also have long had broad discretion to
determine issues of local operation and transportation impacts, hours of
operation, siting, and even the mandating of more stringently reduced
levels of pollution than those initially set as a federal floor.55 Federal
delegated program schemes have similarly made clear that federal clean
air legislation is merely a floor, allowing for additional and more
protective state and local actions. Federal law has never supplanted
these traditional state and local roles.
But should state and local authorities be able to pursue more
aggressive climate change goals by requiring a stationary source (or
other GHG emitters) to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to what is
technologically possible in ways akin to best available technology
performance standards under the Clean Air Act?56 Due to the copollutant problem and many other legitimate state and local land use and
environmental concerns, state and local governments almost certainly
have to retain this authority, even if a polluter has or could secure federal

option is necessary if state regulation is to retain any efficacy in reducing GHG emissions in a
world where emissions (or emissions allowances) might move to other jurisdictions.
54. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 703 (noting this problem).
55. See Buzbee, supra note 39, at 1564-68.
56. For discussion of technology-based standards, especially their benefits despite
their apparent crudity compared to incentive-based instruments, see Sidney A. Shapiro &
Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation,
1991 DUKE L.J. 729 (1991) and Wendy Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based
Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 86 (2000).
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carbon allowances above those allowed by state or local law. This
relates to the “inextricability” problem addressed in the following Part.
The conundrum is at the next step: should state and local governments
be able to prohibit not only that higher rate of pollution, but also the sale
of unused allowances, preclude a pollution source from profiting from
foregone GHG emissions, or, through other means, take such allowances
out of circulation? The difficult question concerns what the facility can
do with those excess emission allowances or never-emitted emissions.
Similarly, should state and local governments retain power to pursue
more aggressive GHG-reduction goals by requiring facilities within the
jurisdiction to utilize a higher number or rate of allowances for a
particular activity than that which is the federal norm? This, too, is a
strategy to force reductions in GHGs and preclude the movement (or
leakage) of that quantity of GHGs to other, more lax jurisdictions.57
This question is difficult because such state and local actions regulating
GHG emissions more stringently than federal law and prohibiting
trading benefits would not literally be under another cap-and-trade
program, but they would affect the federal cap-and-trade market.58
Depending on how allowances are initially distributed, stringent state
regulation (via direct regulation or a higher required allowance rate)
combined with a prohibition on sale of excess allowances, could influence
the market price for allowances by increasing or decreasing their value.
In addition, the reward to an emission source for avoiding emissions
would be lessened by such a state law. Thus, to allow this sort of state
and local action would affect the federal market and modify the
incentives and rewards for pollution-reducing innovations. Reducing the
number of allowances on the market would increase their price, creating
incentives for greater efficiency and related innovations. However,
more costly allowances would undercut short-term, cost-effectiveness
goals. Due to these price effects, state power of this sort must be
explicitly addressed if it is to be allowed. Without an express grant,
preemption challenges by polluters are likely.59
If such additional state climate change efforts were preempted,
however, the effect would be to hobble state and local efforts to foster
more rapid GHG reductions. If any state or local action to require better
performance than federally required always resulted in either sellable
allowances or reduced demand for allowances that others could then buy
57. See Wiener, supra note 1, at 1971-73 (discussing the problems of leakage).
58. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 702-703 (discussing how state initiatives could
interfere with the incentives of a federal cap-and-trade scheme); Glicksman & Levy,
supra note 39, at 642-43.
59. See infra Part III(B) (discussing risks of preemption litigation and broadly
preemptive results if federal climate does not contain strong savings clause provisions).
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for less, then state and local government efforts to make additional
climate progress would be for naught.
Solutions are therefore to:
1. allow state and local governments to impose an additional
allowance charge or tax on emissions of GHGs, which would
permit state and local governments to, in effect, charge more in
federal allowances per ton of GHGs than assumed in the
creation and trading of federal allowances;
2. allow state and local governments by regulation to require
pollution sources to meet required emissions levels, regardless
of GHG effects and the number of allowances held by a source;
3. allow state and local governments to compel the retirement of
excess allowances held as a result of stringent regulatory action,
thereby taking those unused allowances out of circulation; or
4. make states the distributor of auctioned GHG allowances with
authority to retire some. If carbon allowances are auctioned,
then some leakage is likely and perhaps unavoidable, unless
states are handed a central role in distributing allowances,
including authority to withhold allowances under some
statewide allowance budget. A state that chooses to require its
own citizens and sources to emit less, but with no other
constraining regulatory action, would merely result in fewer
purchased allowances, leaving those allowances available for
other states and sources at a lower cost. Such an outcome
would frustrate state efforts to make greater GHG progress than
under the federal cap-and-trade allocations. Only if states could
obtain their share of allowances based on some baseline
calculation and then retire a percentage of them could the
migration of allowances to a less regulated jurisdiction leakage
problem be avoided under an auctioned allowance scenario.
Unless state powers were specifically preserved under one or all of
these powers, the retained state and local power to address climate
change would likely prove illusory. Any levels of pollution below that
which is federally assumed or allowed would merely result in the
shifting of carbon allowances to other polluters outside the jurisdiction.
Once again, all GHG reductions and related climate progress would
depend on the effectiveness of federal law. If state and local governments
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are to be agents of progress, it is critical to protect state and local
government authority to impose more stringent GHG obligations and
preclude polluter profit-making from those additional reductions required
by state law. Since state or local actions would be impinging on
otherwise available allowance trading, they could be seen as interfering
with the six-year period of an exclusively federal cap-and-trade regime.
For this reason, such authority would need to be granted with near
explicit language.60
D. Climate Preemption and the Inextricability Problem
Any efforts to construct a partially preemptive federal climate change
law confront a challenge that I refer to as the “inextricability” problem.
The same ubiquity of GHG sources that makes a climate cap-and-trade
scheme a good idea makes attempted preemption difficult. After all,
actions causing or having an effect on GHGs and climate change are
pervasive. Thus, statutory language leaving pro-preemption advocates
room to argue for preemptive outcomes could pose major risks to broad
swaths of state and local regulatory authority due to the inextricability
problem. Simply stated, virtually all combustion of fossil fuels results in
GHG emissions, as do uses of many solvents and chemicals. The layout
of cities, transportation options, and rate regulation of power plants also
influence GHG-emission levels. The stringency (or laxity) of building
codes as well as conservation and efficiency mandates are hugely
important. Any permitting of a new or expanded stationary source of
pollution will influence resulting GHG emissions. Green space
preservation also has direct GHG linkages in both reducing emissions
associated with deforestation and likely also absorbing carbon dioxide
and thereby acting as a carbon sink. Furthermore, many basic
environmental risks, such as particulate matter, hazardous air pollutants,
and other criteria pollutants under section 108 of the Clean Air Act, are
also GHGs or pollutants emitted along with GHGs. Such accompanying
pollutants are often referred to as “co-pollutants.” Renewable portfolio
standards, a policy adopted by many states, have many goals, and one of
them is often the reduction of GHGs. Tax burdens will influence
incentives where people choose to live, work, or invest, as do subsidies
and positive, monetary incentives. All of these sorts of actions and
regulatory choices influence the resulting carbon footprint. To summarize,

60. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 39, at 609-10 (advocating a “strong judicial
presumption against ceiling preemption under federal environmental statutes in the
absence of an express provision”). For discussion of obstacle preemption, see infra Part
III(C).
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state and local policies that directly and indirectly relate to GHG emissions
and that could affect GHG allowance markets are innumerable.
Since thousands of actions by state and local governments can have
goals other than climate change, or have a climate change focus among
numerous other goals, the question is what a preemptive federal law
would entail. These many-identified state and local actions as well as
many, many others would directly or indirectly influence resulting levels
of GHGs. They might also influence a polluter’s ability to make changes
that could benefit them through carbon-allowance trading. They would
unquestionably “relate to” GHGs or climate change and would also
likely affect the overall market for CO2 allowances.
To work, a partially, or purportedly completely, preemptive federal
climate law would somehow need to weed out traditional, permitted
areas of state and local power. Especially under obstacle preemption
logic detailed below, any preemption language that is not closely
tailored with explicit, focused language could result in preemption
claims against thousands of government actions inextricably linked to
climate change. Once again, the price of ambiguity and policy uncertainties
could be unpredictable, expansive claims about the preemptive reach of
federal law.
The next Part analyzes preemption jurisprudence, demonstrating how
statutory ambiguity on the preemption question could result in a vastly
expanded preemptive impact.
III. WHEN CLIMATE LEGISLATION MEETS THE PREEMPTION
JURISPRUDENCE SWORD
Compromise is often the glue that cements legislative majorities. By
leaving disputes unresolved and accepting a degree of linguistic
ambiguity for later resolution before agencies and courts, partisans may
support a bill.61 Clear language, in contrast, may make the winners and
losers too clear to assemble a workable supportive legislative coalition.
Preemption choices are no different, especially where a bill involves a
challenge as massive as combating climate change. But the efficacy of
61. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984) (setting forth the “two-step” framework for judicial review of agency statutory
interpretations and discussing reasons Congress may leave or create statutory gaps or
ambiguities); see also Kirsten Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 184 (2006) (“Federal preemption can be considered
an unpleasant by-product of interest group lawmaking.”).
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legislative language depends on underlying interpreting frameworks and
the voyage on which a statute will embark.62 The degree of acceptable
ambiguity and policy choice uncertainty, and the effects of such ambiguity
and uncertainty, will vary greatly depending on the underlying body of
interpretive norms and law.
Preemption jurisprudence presents a particularly challenging problem.
The oft-stated prevailing interpretive presumption is the “presumption
against preemption,” seemingly disfavoring preemptive outcomes and
putting the onus on pro-preemption forces to secure explicit propreemption language. 63 The applied reality, however, is actually
unpredictable and often friendly to pro-preemption results. A growing
strain in Supreme Court and Court of Appeals precedents reveals
sympathy for preemptive outcomes. The courts’ stated reasons closely
track “rule of law” virtues, especially the desire for certainty, but these
increasingly preemptive results are perhaps also explained by antiregulatory and pro-business preferences.64 As Professor Young and
others have observed, outside of floor preemption structures, preemption
tends to be anti-regulatory in impact and is sought for that reason.65
Despite abundant scholarly commentary explaining the virtues of nonpreemptive regimes, judicial preemption precedents in recent years tend
to embrace preemption.66

62. Cf. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 20 (1988) (developing the nautical metaphor to describe how the process of
interpretation will over time change the meaning ascribed to a statute).
63. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“[W]e start with
the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded . . .
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”). For works discussing the
“presumption against preemption,” see Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against
Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 709-710 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill,
Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 741-42 (2008); Schroeder,
supra note 34, at 122-23; and Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An
Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 455-59 (2008).
64. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1020 (2008) (holding that a
federal statute preempted state tort action against a medical device manufacturer);
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 532 (2001) (holding that a federal statute
preempted state regulation of tobacco advertising); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529
U.S. 861, 865 (2000) (holding that a federal regulation preempted state common-law
defective design action); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 94 (2000) (holding that a
federal regulation preempted state regulation of oil tankers).
65. See Ernest A. Young, Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in FEDERAL
PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 249, 263 (Richard A. Epstein &
Michael S. Greve eds., 2007); Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. 869 (2008).
66. See Buzbee, supra note 39; McGarity, supra note 32; Young, supra note 66;
see also sources cited, supra note 32, 39, 63 & 65 (discussing the merits of changing
preemption policy trends in the executive branch and courts).
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This problematic pro-preemption case law contains several key
elements. Courts, especially the Supreme Court, often selectively ignore
the “presumption against preemption;” savings clauses are given little or
no weight; and preempted conflicts are readily found, even in laws
lacking express preemptive language.67 Few preemption precedents
develop a normative strain recognizing the benefits of retaining state and
local authority in addition to related federal law.68
Perhaps most significantly, as explored below, the Supreme Court and
following lower courts have begun to develop a growing “obstacle
preemption” jurisprudence where a direct conflict need not be shown for
preemptive outcomes; rather, challenges must merely demonstrate that a
state or local law strikes a different balance than federal law. Because
any state involvement in a field that is also subject to federal regulation
is likely to reflect different priorities than federal law, a different balance
is a near inevitability. Such a different balance could lead federal actors
or affected industry to use preemption case law as a sword to displace
state or local law. Finally, agencies may play a critical interpretive role
in construing statutes to preempt or authorize preemption; those agency
actions may receive judicial deference, meaning that a pro-preemption
president or agency might strategically use ambiguous language to
expand the realm of preempted law.69
Collectively, these preemption precedents create a setting whereby
any intended anti-preemptive results in climate legislation will require
statutory drafting of uncommon clarity. Without it, claims of conflict
preemption, especially obstacle preemption, will arise with great frequency.
This Part is not claiming that pro-preemption results are a certainty but,

67. See infra Parts III(A)-(C).
68. Two notable and important exceptions are Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544
U.S. 431 (2005) and Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). Both cases discuss why
there are benefits of retaining federal regulatory oversight and state common law regimes. As
I have explored elsewhere, Wyeth and several other cases together create doctrinal
support for courts to subject the factual and policy claims underlying agency claims of
preemptive power and effect to “hard look review.” See William W. Buzbee, Preemption
Hard Look Review, Regulatory Interaction, and Quest for Stewardship and
Intergenerational Equity, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1521 (2009).
69. See Mendelson, supra note 63 (discussing this possibility in her article focusing on
whether agencies should receive deference for statutory interpretations underlying preemption
claims); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58
DUKE L.J. 2125 (2009) (discussing agency assertions of preemptive impact and suggesting
doctrinal grounds and other rationales for making agencies more accountable for such
assertions).
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instead, that the underlying law is in disarray. The growing strain of
pro-preemption logic means that statutory ambiguities could over time
result in agency interpretations and cases leaving little room for
independent state and local climate policies. As shown below, retaining
state and local roles is both difficult to avoid and desirable in order to
further the goal of combating climate change.
A. The Erratic Voyage of the “Presumption Against Preemption”
The dominant-stated interpretive norm about preemption is the
“presumption against preemption.” As explained in numerous cases,
this norm is meant to favor the preservation of state law despite federal
law’s constitutional supremacy.70 This anti–preemption norm is rooted
in the Constitution’s federalist structures and the value of preserving
legal domains for state law. This heightened attention to preserving state
law links to the many cases emphasizing the importance of state
sovereignty.
Despite the durability and frequent reiteration of this norm, the
Supreme Court, in reality, states and applies it only sporadically.71 In
Riegel v. Medtronic72 and Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,73 the
Court did not even mention this anti-preemption presumption and ended
up embracing preemptive outcomes. In addition, the Court has neglected
this presumption in interpreting statutes that lack express preemption
provisions.74
Many laws do contain preemptive language, making judicial neglect
of the anti-preemption norm less surprising, but even there, the question
is how broadly to construe preemptive language. In particular, should
express preemption of conflicting “requirements” include preemption of
the possibility of common law liabilities if the law does not mention
common law? On that issue, the Supreme Court has in recent years
seesawed, with the Court’s vacillation tracking the Court’s stated
application or rejection of the “presumption against preemption.” For
example, the most recent major preemption decision, Wyeth v. Levine,75

70. Medronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
71. See Sharkey, supra note 63, at 458-59; see also Calvin Massey, “Joltin’ Joe
Has Left and Gone Away”: The Vanishing Presumption Against Preemption, 66 ALB. L.
REV. 759, 764 (2003) (“[T]he Court . . . continues to simultaneously repeat and ignore
the presumption against preemption.”); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225,
298 (2000) (“The Court itself has applied the presumption only half-heartedly.”).
72. Riegel v. Medtronic, 128 S. Ct. 999, 1006 (2008).
73. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881 (2000).
74. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002); Geier, 529 U.S. at 906.
75. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
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both defended application of this anti-preemption presumption and
reached an anti-preemption result. This outcome in Wyeth, however,
surely does not resolve this question. Wyeth reflects what is the latest of
a series of close 5-4 preemption decisions applying inconsistent
frameworks and reaching different results based on claimed differences
in underlying facts, statutory language, and bodies of regulation. The
slightly earlier Riegel v. Medtronic went decisively the other way, and
the 2005 Bates76 decision was more consistent with Wyeth.77
The bottom line is that the “presumption against preemption” no
longer is applied predictably or consistently. Federal climate legislation
cannot rely on this presumption to tip the interpretive scale against
preemption.
B. The Much-Neglected Savings Clauses
Many statutes contain provisions that “save” state law. With varying
degrees of specificity, they make clear that a federal law or perhaps a
portion of a federal law is not to be implemented or construed to
preempt existing state law. As Professor Zellmer makes clear in her
chapter in Preemption Choice, savings clauses have frequently been
given little to no weight or attention in major Supreme Court preemption
decisions.78 The Court has explicitly said that findings of conflict
preemption are not precluded by the presence of a savings clause.79 In
addition, since some laws contain both preemptive provisions and
savings clauses, the mere presence of a savings clause does not
necessarily shift interpretative modes into a strongly anti-preemptive
stance. This body of law makes clear that if a savings clause is to have
an anti-preemptive effect, it needs to be strongly and specifically
worded. Because the presence of a savings clause does not preclude a
finding of a preempted conflict and because the growing body of
obstacle preemption has expanded what counts as a conflict, additional

76. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).
77. These cases and related precedents are analyzed closely in suggesting agency
preemption claims should be subjected to hard look review in Buzbee, supra note 68, at
1557-76.
78. Sandi Zellmer, When Congress Goes Unheard: Saving Clauses’ Rocky Judicial
Reception, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 34, at 144, 164-166 (William W. Buzbee
ed., 2009).
79. Geier, 529 U.S. at 870.

49

BUZBEE 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2/1/2016 10:56 AM

statutory findings or policy provisions expressly explaining why state
law should be preserved are also likely necessary.
C. The Rise of “Obstacle” Preemption and the
Problem of Multiple Goal Statutes
Although much of preemption jurisprudence concerns interpretation of
statutory language bearing on the preemption question, conflicts can and
will arise between federal and state law, regardless of the subject of
regulation. Little dispute concerns conflicts involving impossibly clashing
requirements, especially clashing design mandates. Such “physical
impossibility conflict” requires a resolution, and the Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause makes clear that federal law trumps state law.
Less obvious and more problematic for climate legislation is the
growing body of “obstacle preemption” law. If a state law’s functioning
stands as an obstacle to purposes evident in a federal law, or perhaps
strikes a different balance regarding competing federal purposes, courts
may find it preempted under obstacle preemption doctrine. Hence, in
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,80 the Court found that the possibility
of tort liability for a car’s lack of an airbag was preempted under
obstacle preemption theory because of federal regulation chose a phasein period for air bags. Tort liability “would have stood as an obstacle to
the gradual, passive restraint phase-in that the federal regulation
deliberately imposed.”81 In one of its earliest applications, in Hines v.
Davidovitz,82 the Court invalidated a state regulation imposing more
requirements on aliens than federal law because such state laws “stand
as an obstacle to the full purpose and objectives of Congress.”83 The
growing body of obstacle preemption cases vary in whether a preemptive
result is reached, but the question remains the same: are the different or
additional state or local regulatory burdens an obstacle to the balance
struck by federal law?
If judges or justices frame the preemption question as whether state
law or actions are contrary to “the balance struck” in federal law, they
are near certain to favor or reach pro-preemption outcomes.84 If that is
80. Id. at 881.
81. Id. For a concise but thorough discussion of Geier and obstacle preemption
doctrine, see Schroeder, supra note 34, at 132-35.
82. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
83. Id. at 66-74.
84. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1221 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing
that federal drug labels should preclude state common law from striking a different balance
than federal actions); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (finding Illinois takeover
law preempted by the federal Williams Act due to how state law differed from
the “balance struck” in federal law); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., v. Paul,
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the question, the frame for analysis is weighted heavily towards
preemption since any different state and local choices, by definition, will
strike a different balance. If a law “interferes with the methods by which
the federal statute was designed to reach [the federal] goal,” then it can
be preempted under obstacle preemption logic even where the state or
local law seeks to achieve the same primary goal as federal law.85 As
Justice Thomas wrote in his Wyeth concurrence, where he issued a
direct, withering attack on the whole doctrinal concept of obstacle
preemption, obstacle preemption is unpredictable and empowers judges
to exercise broad policy discretion.86
The 2003 Second Circuit decision in Clean Air Markets Group v.
Pataki (CAMG) is especially illuminating in assessing climate-change
obstacle-preemption risks.87 CAMG involved the sulfur dioxide acid
rain cap-and-trade program under the Clean Air Act. When New York
tried to restrict trading of SO2 allowances to polluters in upwind states,
an association representing those polluters claimed that New York State
was preempted from taking actions that burdened trading under the
Clean Air Act. The Second Circuit agreed. Noting how burdening of
SO2 trades would undercut the cost-effectiveness goals of the cap-andtrade regime, the court expressed, “[T]here can be no doubt that the
[state law] interferes with the method selected by Congress for
regulating SO2 emissions.”88 By parsing the statute’s language and the
history of related implementing regulations, the court concluded that
New York restrictions on trades were contrary to federal law and a
preempted obstacle “even if . . . it [did] not ‘actually conflict with
federal law because it [was] expressly permitted by” the Clean Air Act’s
floor preemption savings clauses.89 The court concluded that the state
law “impedes the execution of ‘the full purposes and objectives’ of Title
IV[’s acid rain cap-and-trade system].”90

373 U.S. 132, 171 (1963) (White, J., dissenting) (using “the balance struck” terminology
in arguing the Court majority should have found that federal marketing orders preempted
state law differently regulating avocado sales).
85. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494-97 (1987). In Ouellette, the Court’s
application of obstacle preemption ultimately led it to a choice of law decision, applying
state common law of the pollution source’s state, not the law of the victim’s state.
86. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1214-28 (Thomas, J., concurring).
87. Clean Air Markets Group v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82, 86-89 (2d Cir. 2003).
88. Id. at 87.
89. Id. at 89.
90. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidovitz, 471 U.S. at 713).
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Obstacle preemption is thus a particular problem for climate-change
legislation and the preservation of state roles. A federal cap-and-trade
law will almost inevitably result from compromises about the pace of
progress and a desire to balance environmental goals and costs, or it will,
at least, minimize costs to achieve a designated climate goal. Any state
law directly or indirectly relating to climate change and GHG emissions
will necessarily strike a different balance reflecting that jurisdiction’s
more environmentally aggressive priorities. Obstacle preemption doctrine
could result in preemption of state efforts, unless federal law in savings
clauses and policy as well as findings provisions expressly allows
additional or more rapid state and local efforts to reduce GHG
emissions. Also helpful would be provisions that identify other benefits
of preserving state and local regulatory power in order to address climate
change. Such a law would also have to avoid broad or indeterminate
preempting language such as “related to” due to the broad way such a
provision would be interpreted.91
D. Agency Interpretation in the Climate Change
Preemption Crucible
As evident in Geier, Wyeth, and numerous agency declarations and
actions late in the recent Bush Administration, agencies can use their
implementation and interpretive discretion to assert their view that some
state or local action, law or regulation, or even common law is
preempted. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that agency actions
can be the federal law that preempts 92 but has yet to resolve a
longstanding debate regarding whether federal agency declarations about
preemptive impact are subject to deferential judicial reviewing
frameworks. The recent Wyeth case is dismissive of claims of
preemptive impact asserted in a regulatory preamble without advance
notice and opportunity for public input, thus perhaps impliedly indicating
that more process would justify greater deference.93 Several recent
decisions expressly do not resolve this question.
If ambiguities left in federal law empower federal agencies to assert
preemptive impact and receive judicial deference, then poorly resolved
preemption choices in climate legislation could lead a pro-preemption
administration to broaden the preemptive reach of a federal climate law
and limit state authority. Once again, the price of ambiguity and
91. In Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008), the Supreme Court made
clear that preemptive language including the phrase “relating to” “indicates Congress’
[sic] intent to pre-empt a large area of state law to further its purpose.” Id. at 548-49.
92. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
93. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200-02 (2009).
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uncertainties resulting from compromise might be a climate-change law
that, in ultimate application and interpretation, becomes broadly preemptive.
IV. WHY STATE AND LOCAL CLIMATE ROLES ARE DESIRABLE
The major arguments for preserving state and local climate-change
authority logically flow from the preceding sections. Several others also
deserve attention.
Preserving state and local authority despite a federal climate-change
law can serve as a partial antidote to several likely forms of regulatory
failure discussed in Part I. If federal law proves to be too lax either in
the level of its cap or in the rate of progress, state and local governments
could choose to take supplemental, more stringent actions. These,
concededly, would burden those regulated more than under federal law
alone. This ability of state and local governments to take more stringent
actions could, nevertheless, prove critical and beneficial in several
respects. First, widespread state and local actions could reduce the
nation’s aggregate emissions, thereby leading to environmental progress
despite what might be an unduly lax federal law. Second, a groundswell
of additional and possibly different state and local climate-change efforts
could, once again, play a critical role in catalyzing support for additional
or amended federal legislation.94 Industry hoping to avoid too many
diverse state and local initiatives might support federal legal change. If
state and local actors were legally precluded from action, then progress
could falter and the states-as-catalyst dynamic would be lost.95
In addition, federal law could fail if a lack of monitoring and
enforcement destroyed the integrity of the new carbon-allowance
market. Empowering state and local governments to play their own
supplementary roles in enforcing the law could be the equivalent of
additional cops on the beat.96 With higher rates of monitoring, detection
of violations, and punishment, rates of compliance would likely increase.
Correspondingly, retaining overlapping and cooperative state and local
climate regulation roles would result in state and local governments
continuing to gain GHG regulation expertise. With that experience

94. See sources cited, supra note 4.
95. See generally Kaswan, supra note 46.
96. See Andreen, supra note 5 (discussing diverse state climate initiatives); Engel,
supra note 61, at 178-81 (discussing regulatory safety nets); Schapiro, supra note
35, at 44 (articulating the benefits of regulatory redundancy).
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might come ideas for ways to improve federal law.97 If at the end of the
period of preemptive federal cap-and-trade exclusivity states desired to
initiate their own additional GHG regulation and trading regime, the
start-up hurdles would be less formidable.
Preserving state and local climate roles would also leave room to
engage in policy innovation and experimentation.98 A federal cap-andtrade regime might prove highly effective, but additional measures are
sure to be needed. Apart from the broadly shared goal of creating a
liquid and thriving carbon-trading market—a goal assisted by a single
federal trading market—many other strategies could also prove effective
in reducing GHG emissions. Pollution trading is a promising way to
find cost-effective means to meet a pollution goal but, by definition,
does not prod polluters to extend beyond the cap’s required aggregate
reductions. Numerous other regulatory strategies can also help reduce
GHG emissions, as they have long helped address other environmental
ills. The optimal mix of mandates, technology forcing, incentive-based
tools such as taxes and subsidies, site-specific imposition of rigorous
performance goals, among many other strategies, is not yet known.
Giving state and local governments latitude to experiment serves to
diversify the risks posed by a single, federal regulatory monopoly. Even
a trading regime could benefit from different state or regional
experiences in setting up their own markets. The several state and
regional carbon-trading regimes in place at this time utilize somewhat
different strategies.99 Provided that the tradable GHG allowances and
credits are sufficiently uniform to facilitate trades across jurisdictional
borders, the content and institutional arrangements under cap-and-trade
regimes would likely also benefit from allowing diverse strategies; the
federal regime, other states, and possibly other nations, all could learn by
comparing the efficacy, in actual implementation, of diverse approaches
to GHG regulation and even cap-and-trade regulatory strategies.
State and local governments also provide additional venues in which
citizens and stakeholders can participate and nudge governments and
polluters to improve. Federal regulatory venues can be invaluable, but
different sorts of participation and input, often at lower cost, may be
facilitated by preservation of state and local government roles.
Similarly, federal actors may be uninterested in smaller-scale subjects of
97. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 700 (discussing how state initiates could lead to
more stringent federal regulation).
98. See William W. Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk
Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145, 152-55 (2007); Engel,
supra note 61, at 182-83; Schapiro, supra note 35, at 43.
99. For an analysis of current state initiatives, see Adelman & Engel, supra note 3,
at 862-875.
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regulation that could easily be reached at more local levels. Hence, state
and local regulatory roles could serve to enhance participation while also
filling in regulatory gaps left in federal law.
Even without federal error, reliance on a single regulator poses high
risks of stasis. The regulatory temptation to take an action and not
revisit it has long been noted, leading to calls for regulatory look-back,
creation of regulatory “hammers” incentivizing regulatory reexamination,
and imposition of statutory deadlines.100 Any regulatory reexamination
poses risks of revealing imprudence, error, and ineffective regulation.
Furthermore, recent precedents greatly strengthen government defenses
to lawsuits intended to address agency inaction. Unless either an
enabling act grants a particular cause of action to address inaction or a
law mandates “required” and “discrete” actions, courts cannot prompt an
agency to act.101
Despite these barriers to prompting federal action, if state and local
governments retain latitude for their own additional and different climate
strategies, then stakeholders have another venue in which to pursue their
ideas. Diverse state and local strategies may reveal effective measures
that then can be copied by other states and, possibly, federal regulators.
One need not wishfully rely on selfless federal actors eager to both
engage in self-criticism and subject themselves to more work in order to
reveal and test new ideas; state and local actions can establish new
possibilities. Retaining a diversity of actors and latitude for diverse
regulatory arrangements can, thus, serve to foster “democratic
experimentalism” and “learning by monitoring,” with others able to
learn from benchmarked best practices. 102 This is true for GHG
mitigation strategies and, as shown in a forthcoming article by Professor
Camacho,103 adaptation strategies. The price of misguided strategies
also is far lower if state and local governments can give new strategies a
test run. As Professor Carlson observes, California has often used its

100. See, e.g., C URTIS C OPELAND , U.S. C ONGRESSIONAL R ESEARCH S ERVICE ,
REEXAMINING RULES: SECTION 610 OF THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT (2005),
https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/2360/RL32801_20050311.pdf?
sequence=1.
101. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 65 (2004).
102. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 287-88 (1998).
103. See generally Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate
Change: Learning to Manage Uncertainty, 59 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2009), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pap ers.cfm?abstract_id=1352693.
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special Clean Air Act powers to innovate in helpful ways, but it has also
helped avoid larger-scale national mistakes due to experience gained
from failed state strategies.104
V. PREEMPTION CRITERIA AND THE VALUE OF A PREEMPTION
REVIEW COMMITTEE
Despite this Article’s arguments against preempting state and local
government climate change roles, it remains virtually unavoidable that
conflicts will arise between federal and state and local law. It is also
likely that, in order to assemble an adequate coalition that will support
federal climate legislation, at least limited preemption language will be
necessary. This Part suggests how to design limited preemptive
provisions that reduce the risk of stasis and error while retaining the
potential benefits of state and local action. This Part also suggests that
federal law should create a Preemption Review Committee as the initial
venue in which to hear preemption claims by federal officials or private
actors.
A. Minimal Preemptive Language
The most justifiable preemptive language would create a single,
federally designed carbon dioxide allowance. Because there are numerous
GHGs with different climate effects, and because offsets will also arise
out of different activities, a federal law would need to attribute values to
these climate-related emissions and offsets. Legislatively dictating these
equivalencies and ratios would hasten implementation of the law but
would pose substantial risks of error and stasis. Ideally, federal climate
legislation would set, to the extent feasible based on the best-available
data, ratios and equivalencies; it would also address the stasis risk by
creating an agency obligation to reexamine these assumptions every
few years and also provide for a petition process whereby anyone could
prompt a revisiting of these carbon allowance and offset values.105
Preserving broad participation rights and requiring agency responses to
such petitions would also reduce the risk of agency stasis.
Second, creating a single national cap-and-trade regime would serve
to focus all on one market, reducing transaction costs and helping to
create a single clearinghouse for information and trades. A single
104. Carlson, supra note 43.
105. Oddly, the Waxman-Markey climate bill draft of June 5, 2009 was careful to
create a petition process for allowance equivalencies and designation of GHGs but did
not do so for offsets. The two provisions should have symmetrical periodic review and
petition procedures.
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domestic carbon market would also ease integration into international
trading regimes. Further, it would simplify efforts to monitor the market
and certify trades, claimed underlying emissions levels, and offset
activities. The risk, as stated above, is that the cap would be too high or
slow to decrease and also that something about the market’s structure
would prove dysfunctional. Correspondingly, lack of monitoring and
enforcement could undercut the market’s integrity and destroy the value
of carbon allowances. If the single national market would permanently
preempt other levels of government, only federal legislative or agency
willingness to fix the market could rectify problems.
The best resolution to risks of a single national cap-and-trade market
is what appears likely in the leading climate change bill. Creating a
single, preemptive federal cap-and-trade market while limiting the
duration of its preemptive effect would give the federal regime a chance
to get rolling. A period of federal exclusivity would also prompt all
parties to work out the kinks in the federal regime rather than abandon it
for some other legal regime or market. By giving the federal market
preemptive exclusivity for several years, even opponents of climate
legislation would have incentives to make the federal law work so that
states and regions would not revive or create their own cap-and-trade
markets at the end of the preemptive period. In addition, much as
allowance-creation should be subject to agency reexamination and
stakeholder petition rights for modification via notice and comment
processes, a federal cap-and-trade market should have its own similar
mechanisms to address flaws and institute improvements. Thus,
although a limited preemptive phase would be part of the law, administrative
reexamination and amendment procedures could address risks of error,
even if the protections of federalism are temporarily lost.106
Apart from focusing all on a single, federal GHG currency and a
single, federal market for a limited time, state and local roles should be
broadly preserved via savings clauses and findings as well as policy
provisions that document reasons to allow additional state and local
actions that could not only directly or indirectly relate to GHG
emissions, but also possibly affect the federal cap-and-trade market.
Due to the ubiquity of activities linked to climate change, broad
preservation of state and local roles is necessary to avoid a landslide of

106. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE
L.J. 2023, 2109 (2008).
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preemption litigation, where a federal climate law would be used as a
sword to weaken state and local laws.
B. For a Preemption Review Committee and Structured
Review of Preemption Claims
Even with only limited preemptive language and well-crafted savings
clauses, conflicts will arise and prompt claims that state or local actions
or laws are preempted. As discussed above in Part III, preemption
jurisprudence has become unpredictable. Among its problems lies
uncertainty among judges regarding how to determine whether a conflict
that would require preemption actually exists. Some courts will take
evidence on this question, as was the case at the trial level in the recent
Wyeth v. Levine decision, which the Supreme Court majority reviewed in
depth when it declined to preempt state tort law. In other cases, however,
courts often focus just on the statutory interpretation question and give
little attention the realities of the claimed conflict.107 In those cases,
judicial views about the value of regulation and, especially, regulatory
overlap and interaction seem more important than actual evidence about
a conflict. In addition, as mentioned above, courts often barely give
attention to the presence of savings provisions. As generalists, it is
doubtful that courts often know about the benefits of regulatory
interaction and overlap, especially in particular regulatory settings.
Instead, courts are likely mainly to hear the complaints of industry that is
unhappy with additional obligations or liabilities imposed by state or
local law.108

107. See generally Buzbee, supra note 68, at 1553-80 (discussing frequent judicial
and scholarly focus on the question of agency statutory authority to preempt, and deriving
doctrinal and policy arguments for more closely scrutinizing the factual and policy
rationales for preemption under a “hard look review” framework); Sharkey, supra note
69, at 2178-91 (discussing ways courts could encourage agencies to make preemption
judgments in a more transparent and accountable manner).
108. A recent congressional report on Food and Drug Administration pro-preemption
declarations reveals that career officials disputed the empirical basis for political appointees’
pro-preemption claims about conflicts between regulatory obligations and tort law.
MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, FDA CAREER STAFF
OBJECTED TO AGENCY PREEMPTION POLICIES 4 (2008), http://oversight.house.gov/documents/
20081029102934.pdf. In two related cases before the Supreme Court, Riegel v. Medtronic,
128 S. Ct. 999, 1010-11 (2008) and Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1877, 1219-20 (2009)
(Alito, J., dissenting), five and then three justices, respectively, largely adopted the antitort, pro-preemption views embraced by political leadership at the FDA and favored by
industry, but which in reality had been rejected as empirically unsound by career staff experts.
The justices took this perspective with little or no empirical support. The majority in
Wyeth rejected this approach. In the climate arena, the Preemption Review Committee idea
proposed here is meant to reduce the risk that judges, justices, and agency officials will
resolve preemption claims based on intuition and political preferences.
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Three simple means can be taken to address this judicial tendency to
make conclusory preemption findings without adequate consideration of
underlying evidence. The first is for the Supreme Court to call for “hard
look” review of evidence underlying government or private sector
claims that alleged conflicts with federal law require preemption.109 A
second option is for Congress to make clear in judicial review provisions
that agency or private claims of preemptive effect require submission of
evidence as well as either a hearing or a notice and comment process
prior to agency or judicial resolution of a preemption claim.
The third means involves creating a Preemption Review Committee
composed of top federal officials and, perhaps, also including a few
state-appointed representatives. It would be modeled after the Endangered
Species Committee (ESC), also known as the “God Squad.” The ESC is
authorized to utilize an on-the-record (but mostly paper) process to
consider petitions seeking permission to take actions that threaten
endangered species or their habitats, despite otherwise applicable
Endangered Species Act (ESA) prohibitions.110 The ESC’s determinations
must be based on this on-the-record introduced evidence and, for a
petition grant, make specific findings under ESA criteria, including
evidence about the overall benefits and costs of a proposed action. The
ESC’s actions are reviewable in the courts based on this underlying
record and its ruling. The effect of the ESC is to create a safety valve
for the ESA’s generally strong prohibitions, but it also tests petitioners
by requiring proof both of the merits of a project and that means to avoid
endangered species harms truly do not exist.
A Climate Change Preemption Review Committee would similarly
test federal or private actors who claim that state and local action must
be preempted. Since several federal agencies would likely be involved
in implementing and enforcing a federal climate law, the Committee
would not be composed of officials from only one agency. And because
state perspectives on state law would be important, so would be giving
states a Committee voice. Even if not actually on the Committee, states
109. See Buzbee, supra note 68.
110. See generally Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984
F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993) (reviewing the key language and requirements applicable to
the Committee in challenge to actions of the Endangered Species Committee, especially
ex parte communication,); Oliver S. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its
Implementation by the U.S Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV.
278, 330-33 (1993).
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would need to have an opportunity to participate since a preemption
claim would threaten to nullify state law. Partisans and the Committee
would not only have to construe federal and state or local laws to show
that federal law is meant to preempt state or local law (at least, if they
conflict), but they also would have to show how, in actual application,
federal and state or local laws or actions create conflicts worthy of
preemption under the federal law’s criteria. Those criteria would need to
include language allowing preemption both in settings of physical
impossibility and upon proof that a state or local law actually imposes a
conflict that leads to increased GHG emissions or otherwise exacerbates
climate change. Other preemption claims based on allegations of undue
conflict and unreasonable burdens would need to balance overall
benefits of retaining state and local regulatory power with particular
individualized burdens that might arise, with greatest weight given to
climate change goals. Again, proof of both the benefits of state and
local law and resulting harms would be needed. Only if, overall, state
and local law created a conflict that in some way undercut federal
climate change goals could it be held preempted. The Committee’s
statutory criteria would also call for declarations of preemptive impact to
be narrowly tailored, preserving state and local authority to address
climate change as much as possible.
By utilizing a Preemption Review Committee, preemption claims
would not be resolved on an ad hoc basis heavily influenced by general
views about the value of regulation or gut responses to claims of conflict.
Statutory criteria would focus the Committee on general benefits of both
state and local climate efforts while also examining the particular burdens
claimed. The Committee’s tailored discretion would, in turn, constrain
courts from overreaching. The availability of judicial review, however,
would remain important in order to ensure that the Committee’s own
work did not become politicized or inattentive to statutory criteria and
presumptions.
At this time, leading federal climate bills do not contain any structure
like this, but creation of a Preemption Review Committee would create a
safety valve to address settings where preemption really is needed while
also constraining and guiding such preemption review by dictating that
the Committee and any reviewing courts assess actual underlying facts
in light of statutory criteria. A subsequent judicial hard look at the
Committee’s determinations would further support the integrity of the
process. Moreover, such a specialized tribunal would, over time, increase
expertise on climate change preemption conflicts.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Federal climate legislation confronts numerous distinctive risks of
regulatory failure. Protecting state and local power to take additional
and more stringent steps to address climate change preserves incentives
for stakeholders to address flaws in federal climate legislation while also
retaining state and local room for policy innovations. In addition, due to
the ubiquity of GHG emissions, it is difficult to extricate regulatory
actions that focus on GHGs from regulation directed at other sorts of
pollution and risk. Express preservation of state and local regulatory
power that impinges on carbon regulation and markets is important to
preclude industry use of federal climate legislation as a preemption
sword. Ambiguous language regarding the preemptive effect of federal
legislation would be a recipe for decades of preemption litigation.
Despite the often-stated presumption against preemption, actual recent
preemption cases reveal preemption jurisprudence that is increasingly
sympathetic to preemptive outcomes, especially under obstacle
preemption logic. To avoid unpredictable preemption litigation and
preserve state and local roles, statutory preemption criteria and antipreemption presumptions would help, as would the creation of a
Preemption Review Committee to hear and resolve preemption claims.
The Article also demonstrates how state and local climate roles can only
be preserved and effective if state and local governments have the
authority either to retire carbon allowances or to charge more in carbon
allowances per ton of GHG emissions. Ideally, state and local
governments would also play in role in distributing allowances. Without
these sorts of authority, state and local stringency would just result in
leakage of those emissions to other jurisdictions, possibly at lowered
costs. If that were the case, then all climate change hopes would depend
on the adequacy of federal legislation or binding international treaty
commitments. Preservation of state and local authority is a more
prudent alternative.
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